Payments to Foreign Officials by Multinational Corporations: Bribery or Business Expense and the Effects of United States Policy by Sinkeldam, Michael S.
COMMENTS
PAYMENTS TO FOREIGN OFFICIALS BY MULTINA-
TIONAL CORPORATIONS: BRIBERY OR BUSINESS
EXPENSE AND THE EFFECTS OF
UNITED STATES POLICY
The successful transaction of business in the international
community by a corporation necessitates compliance with certain
accepted international trade customs and practices. Throughout
the global business market, payment of funds to consultants,
agents, middlemen or foreign officials is a prerequisite to suc-
cessful transaction of business.' Multinational corporations
(MNC's)2 expend a substantial amount of corporate funds in such
1. Hearings on Political Contributions to Foreign Governments Before the
Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 167 (1975) (testimony of Thomas V. Jones,
President and Chairman of the Board of Northrop Corp.) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings]. A portion of the testimony appears below:
Senator PERCY. Had you had a frustration in not being able prior to the
15 years overseas experience you had in not being able to really land
overseas contracts and, this was impairing your business, and that you
as a management, wondered why and began to study the arrangements of
some of those who had been more successful? [sic]
Mr. JONES. Precisely.
Id. See also S. Res. 265, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 16,735 (daily ed.
Sept. 25, 1975) (co-authored and submitted by Senator Ribicoff and based on facts
revealed in the investigation being conducted by the Senate Subcommittee on
Multinational Corporations). In his remarks Senator Ribicoff stated that:
[P]olicies and practices in foreign nations necessitate the use of special
and unusual payments through middlemen, and the use of direct and in-
direct payments to foreign government officials, to reasonably and effec-
tively compete in those markets ...
Id. See generally Polk, Slush, THE NEw REPUBLIC, May 17, 1975, at 21; TIME,
June 23, 1975, at 52; Wall Street Journal, May 9, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
2. A multinational corporation is defined as a related group of companies
operating simultaneously in different countries and therefore subject to different
national jurisdictions, but under the corporate control of one parent company.
Litvak & Maule, The Multinational Corporation: Some Economic and Political-
Legal Implications, 5 J.W.T.L. 631, 632 (1971) [hereinafter cited at Litvak &
Maule]. To explain further the context of this definition, the authors state:
Thus, this firm has its base in one country, but operates and resides
under the laws and customs of other countries as well. To be multi-
national in the operational sense, it is not necessary for local nationals
to own shares in the subsidiary operations, although they may. The par-
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a manner to compete in international commerce.3 This payment
of "transaction fees" is a standard practice in many multinational
business transactions.
4
Many of the MNC's which engage in this practice are subject
to United States policy.5 Contrary to attitudes in foreign countries,
ent company is one with worldwide business interests. Its foreign affili-
ates may be branch plants, wholly-or partially-owned subsidiaries or
joint-ventures, sometimes involving licensing agreements and manage-
ment contract arrangements.
Id. at 632. The primary objective of a multinational corporation is to integrate
the activities of its foreign subsidiaries with those of the parent to form a single
entity operating to maximize profits by serving the international market. Behr-
man, The Multinational Enterprise: Its Initiatives and Governmental Reactions, 6
J. INV'L L & EcoN. 215, 217 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Behrman].
3. In the course of its investigation of clandestine expenditures made by
multinational corporations, the United States Senate Subcommittee on Multina-
tional Corporations has revealed the payment of an estimated $50 million by
Exxon Corporation to Italian officials. Hearings, supra note 1, at 75 (testimony
of Archie L. Monroe, Controller, Exxon Corp). $5 million was paid by Gulf Oil
Corp. to other foreign officials. Id. at 8-9 (testimony of B.R. Dorsey, Chairman
of the Board of Directors, Gulf Oil Corp). Also under investigation, Northrop
Corp. disclosed to the subcommittee that it distributed $450,000 to two Saudi
Arabian generals, $15,000 to an Indonesian politician, and $4,400 to an Iranian
tax official. id. at 120-23 (testimony of Richard W. Miller, Chairman of the
Executive Committee of the Northrop Board of Directors). In addition, Northrop
allegedly has established a $30 million slush fund for payments to foreign officials.
33 CONG. Q. 1211 (June 14, 1975). Lockheed Corp. also admitted the payment
of $100 million in commissions into Saudi Arabia. Hearings, supra note 1, at 353
(testimony of D.J. Haughton, Chairman of the Board, Lockheed Corp).
4. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 380 (testimony of Ned Ridings, Sales
Representative, Lockheed Corp). A portion of his testimony appears below:
Senator BIDEN .... [Wlere any of you aware of the fact that any of
your foreign competitors . . . were competing in the same manner in
which you were? That is, were they offering kickbacks, or whatever
term you want to use, for money on top?
Mr. RIDINGS. I do not know the details of their arrangements but most
major manufacturers . . . are represented overseas by consultants or
agents.
Id. See also Hearings, supra note 1, at 381 (testimony of D. J. Haughton,
Chairman of the Board, Lockheed Corp). A portion of his testimony appears
below:
Senator BIDEN. . . . You say the reason for engaging in these practices
is to stay competitive. You needed to do it in order to be competitive, is
that correct? That is your basic premise?
Mr. HAUGHTON. You have to do it to be competitive not only with for-
eigners but with-
Senator BIDEN. With anybody.
Mr. HAUGHTON. With anybody.
Id. Payments are made in a myriad of ways. Most commonly, they appear as
entertainment expenses, consultants' or agents' fees, or in most instances are
simply incorporated into the basis of the contractual bargaining process itself. See
Wall Street Journal, May 9, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
5. Litvak & Maule, supra note 2, at 632. The authors point out that "in
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such payments are vociferously condemned in the United States
where the distribution of funds in this manner is characterized as
illegal bribery.' However, the payment of bribes to consultants,
agents, middlemen or foreign officials is not expressly made illegal
by present federal statutes.7  Nevertheless, in an effort to imple-
ment domestic policy, indirect attempts to curtail these payments
are being made by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC)8 and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). MNC's usually
distribute these payments in a clandestine manner and deduct them
from taxable income as a business expense. 10 Such undisclosed
payments are not legally deductible expenses, however, and an
MNC which secretly disburses funds in this manner while deduct-
ing them as expenses may be in violation of both securities and tax
regulations.11
International and United States attitudes pertaining to the use
of such transaction fees conflict. This comment will examine the
international and American policies concerning the regulation of
such payments. In doing so, the activities of the SEC, IRS and
United Nations will be explored. In turn, the detrimental effects
1965 . . .70 percent of [these corporations] had their headquarters in the United
States." Id.
6. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 1, at 2 (opening statement of Senator
Church). Senator Church states:
In short, we cannot close our eyes to this problem. It is no longer suffi-
cient to simply sigh and say that is the way business is done. It is time
to treat the issue for what it is: a serious foreign policy problem.
Id. See also 121 CONG. REC. 7530 (daily ed. May 6, 1975) (Remarks of Senator
Clark based on facts revealed in the Senate Subcommittee on Multinational
Corporations' investigation). In his remarks Senator Clark stated that:
The United States Government cannot condone these practices. When
they come to light-as they do eventually-they seriously tarnish not
only the reputation of the company involved, but that of United States
corporations generally and the United States itself.
Id.
7. See, e.g., remarks of Congressman Solarz before the House of Represent-
atives, 121 CONG. REc. 5043 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1975), in which he states:
One of the very discouraging aspects of this whole situation is the fact
that the Federal Government does not have the authority to monitor
overseas business activities ...
Id. (emphasis added).
8. Id. In further remarks to the House, Congressman Solarz noted that
although there is no Federal authority to monitor the overseas business activities
of MNC's, "[clertain IRS and SEC regulations indirectly prohibit secret and/or
illegal payments but these are somewhat limited in their applicability."
9. Id. See also 121 CONG. REC. 11,342 (daily ed. June 23, 1975) (remarks
of Senator Haskell).
10. See note 54, infra, and accompanying text.
11. See notes 41 and 59, infra, and accompanying text.
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upon MNC's and the United States resulting from unilateral appli-
cation of United States policy will be discussed. Finally, this
comment will conclude that the use of transaction fees is necessary
if MNC's are to compete in the international market, and that the
United States should not unilaterally pursue curtailment of this
practice.
I. THE USE OF BRIBERY As AN INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM
The use of "bribery" or transaction fees to obtain favorable
trade policies is an historically accepted international business cus-
tom. Incidents of this nature are recorded as having occurred as
early as the 1600's.12 One such incident involved the British East
India Company which exchanged "rare treasures," including paint-
ings, carvings and costly objects of copper, brass and stone with
Mogul rulers to obtain duty-free treatment for its exports. 3 The
effect of such incidents was to establish the use of transaction fees
as a bargaining tool employed both by businesses wishing to export
their technology and by underdeveloped nations desiring to import
such technology.
The development of this practice is largely a result of the
history and economic structures of countries in which MNC's
transact business. 4 Absent the existence of price or quality com-
petition similar to that which exists in the United States, the
business markets of less industrialized nations promote the use of
social connections and family relations.' 5 In West Africa, such
practices represent a form of institutionalized welfare under which
any individual acquiring a government position must, by tradi-
tion, care for his relatives and close friends.' 6 In cases of this
nature, transaction fees are actually a component of the political
systems of many underdeveloped countries.17 The use of transac-
12. Gwirtzman & Novak, Reform of Bribery Abroad Involves U.S. Policy,
L.A. Times, Oct. 5, 1975, § 4, at 1, col. 8 [hereinafter cited as Gwirtzman &
Novak]. Milton Gwirtzman is an international attorney who maintains offices in
Washington, D.C. and Paris. Alan Novak is an attorney and businessman and
was formerly executive assistant to the Undersecretary of State.
13. Id.
14. See notes 27 and 29, infra, and accompanying text.
15. Id.
16. L.A. Times, Nov. 13, 1975, at 22, col. 4. This article is based on reports
from correspondents situated in Africa, Latin America, Paris, the Middle East,
Tokyo, Mexico City, West Germany, Moscow, London, Rome, Washington, D.C.,
and Los Angeles.
17. See Curry, The Multinational Corruption, Tim NATION, May 24, 1975, at
1976
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tion fees is not found exclusively in low-level government positions,
but prevails in high-level government positions as well.
In politically volatile nations, deliberately low compensation
coupled with the high risk of short tenure for key government
officials necessitates solicitation and acceptance of transaction
fees to supplement income. 8 MNC's are often targets of those
seeking transaction fees because it is considered a more acceptable
policy to extract money from these wealthy firms rather than from
the country which the official represents. 19 Since many MNC's
have sales greater than the gross national products of many nations,
they are viewed as being better equipped financially to bear such
expenses.2" Compliance with the practice of paying transaction
fees in nations where an MNC operates is essential to insure the
smooth transaction of business.2
Fierce competition among Japanese, Western European and
United States MNC's motivates corporations to engage in the use of
transaction fees, 2 because contraots for new business are fre-
quently awarded to the MNC tendering the most appealing offer to
key officials of the host government.23 Eventually, this process
evolves into a bidding competition wherein acceptance is based
upon the offer which channels the most money to the appropriate
officials.24 For this reason, successful competition on an interna-
tional scale without the use of transaction fees is virtually impossi-
ble.
621. In this article, the author expresses his opinion that the disclosure of
payments in this manner by MNC's is evidence that "bribery is built into the
political systems of underdeveloped countries, where -the multinational corpora-
tions acquire most of their raw materials .. "
18. For example in 1973, in the Brazilian Army's quartermaster corps, an
investigation by the Brazilian Government revealed 'that a dozen high Army
officers had received payments from civilian contractors for supplying them with
food and equipment. 121 CONG. REc. 7531 (daily ed. May 6, 1975).
19. Gwirtzman & Novak, supra note 12, at 4, col. 2.
20. Litvak & Maule, supra note 2, at 632. The authors point out, for
example, that "in 1965 . . . 87 corporations in the world . . . had sales greater
than the gross national product of 57 nation states ....
21. See note 1, supra.
22. Wall Street Journal, May 9, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
23. Vaitsos, Foreign Investment Policies and Economic Development in
Latin America, 7 J.W.T.L. 619, 629 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Vaitsos]. The
host government is the sovereign country in which a subsidiary of an MNC
operates.
24. Wall Street Journal, May 9, 1975, at 1, col. 1. For example, in one case
of bidding competition, one American firm even outbribed another American firm
for a mining concession.
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Transaction fees, however, are not paid exclusively for the
acquisition of new business. To a large extent, funds are distribut-
ed to insure the continued existence of markets or to preserve
favorable relations with local officials in the nation where an MNC
transacts business.25 Such payments usually originate either as a
willing fee, solicited by the representative of an MNC, or as an
unwilling fee,2" extorted from an MNC by local officials who
threaten economic retaliation for failure to cooperate. Regardless
of the nature of the fee, its payment is essential for business and
therefore is widely used.
Many instances exist in which transaction fees are used by
MNC's and foreign officials to facilitate the efficient transaction of
business.17  In many Latin American countries, for example, un-
ion officials and labor inspectors are regularly paid such fees as
part of a standard practice which is essential to maintain peaceful
labor relations.2" MNC's also pay transaction fees in many of
these same Latin American nations to exert pressure on local gov-
ernments to modify laws or policies unfavorable to the foreign
firms.2 9
Recognizing the need for extensive use of transaction fees on
an international scale, many MNC's employ agents or middlemen
to effect payment or to serve as business advisors or consultants.3 0
Employment of such personnel is required in many instances be-
cause certain foreign officials will accept fees only from a trusted,
native countryman acting as intermediary. 31 Syrian law, for exam-
ple, requires that a local agent be retained before business negotia-
tions may even be initiated.32 Under similar circumstances, when
25. Id.
26. Not all payments to foreign officials are voluntary. In the most blatant
case of extortion, a threat was made by the ruling party leader that Gulf Oil
operations in South Korea would be closed down unless a $4 million donation was
made to his presidential election campaign. Hearings, supra note 1, at 8-9
(testimony of B.R. Dorsey, Chairman of the Board of Directors, Gulf Oil Corp).
27. 121 CONG. REc. 7531 (daily ed. May 6, 1975). In African countries
such as Nigeria and Zaire, bribes must be paid to get anything done. They are
part of the price of visas, getting customs clearance on items, and in Nigeria, they
are even necessary for travelers to get their suitcases.
28. Dehner, Multinational Enterprise and Racial Non-Discrimination: Unit-
ed States Enforcement of an International Human Right, 15 HARV. INT'L L.J. 71,
75 n.20 (1974).
29. Vaitsos, supra note 23, at 629-630.
30. See 33 CONG. Q. 1211 (June 14, 1975).
31. Wall Street Journal, May 9, 1975, at 10, col. 3-4.
32. Dow & EI-Batal, The Commercial Laws of Syria, THE DIGEST OF
1976
6
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 6, No. 2 [1976], Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol6/iss2/6
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
Northrop Corporation attempted to sell military aircraft to Saudia
Arabia, the Saudi Arabian Defense Minister directed Northrop's
international consultant to retain a particular agent who had been
employed in previous dealings with the Lockheed and Raytheon
Corporations."3 Agents and middlemen may also be employed for
their governmental connections and familiarity with local laws and
customs.3 4  Such agents or middlemen frequently serve in bona
fide consulting capacities, and the advice -they offer significantly
contributes to the success of an MNC in the host country.35 Re-
gardless of the capacity in which they serve, the use of agents or
middlemen is often a concomitant of success.
The attitude of approval toward payment of transaction fees is
not shared by legislators and agencies within the United States who
advocate immediate curtailment of this practice. As a result,
American based MNC's are placed in the untenable position of
jeopardizing their business interests abroad or facing legal sanc-
tions at home for failure to comply with United States policy.
II. BRIBERY UNDER UNITED STATES LAW
Bribery under the law of the United States has been defined as
the corrupt payment or receipt of a private price for official ac-
tion.36 In accord with this concept, many United States legislators
COMMERCIAL LAWS OF TuE WORLD, 41, 43 (1972). The pertinent sections
pertaining to the transaction of business in Syria are set forth below:
(g) Foreign Companies and Branches of Foreign Companies
Companies and firms formed outside Syrian territory . . . cannot
form a branch or agency in Syria to work in their name. . . unless they
register in the ministry of economy. . . . Non-Syrian governmental
enterprises . . . in which a foreign government is associated, which seek
to form a branch in Syria, must also register in the ministry after getting
a special authorization from the council of state ....
To this application must be attached:
(4) A notarized document of representation showing the name of
the agent representing the company in Syria and that this agent is in ef-
fect dwelling in Syria. This representative may be an individual of
Syrian nationality or a commercial company instituted in Syria and con-
forming to Syrian law.
33. 33 CONo. Q. 1211 (June 14, 1975).
34. 121 CONG. REC. 16,735 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1975) (Remarks by Senator
Ribicoff). In his remarks, Senator Ribicoff acknowledges the argument asserted
by American companies that due to their unfamiliarity with local customs, the
hiring of agents was necessary to compete in these countries.
35. Gwirtzman & Novak, supra note 12, at 4, col. 4. See also 33 CONG. Q.
1211 (June 14, 1975).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 209 (1970). This section punishes employees of the United
States who receive outside compensation for any services rendered in any manner
Vol. 6
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and governmental agencies view the undisclosed payment of corpo-
rate funds by MNC's to consultants, agents, middlemen or foreign
officials as bribery, and, therefore, a violation of United States
law.37 Out of this position, an attempt is being made by these legis-
lators and agencies to regulate unilaterally the international business
activities of MNC's. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has
formed a subcommittee to make a factual investigation of the
activities of MNC's abroad in an attempt to discover if any viola-
tions have occurred, and if so, what sanctions are appropriate.3 8
Despite this attitude, no present federal statutes provide the
necessary authority to regulate or impose sanctions for payments
abroad by American-based MNC's.3 9 This lack of existing law,
however, has not thwarted the determination of some legislators
and agencies to curtail the practice.40 In an effort to pursue this
policy, both the SEC and IRS are attempting to discourage the
use of such payments.
A. The SEC: Requirement of Disclosure
SEC regulations provide one means of indirectly enforcing the
policy favoring curtailment of bribery abroad. Their aim is to
protect shareholders from undisclosed use of corporate funds.
MNC's registered with the SEC which secretly disburse these
payments have been charged with violating sections 13(a) and
14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19344' for failure to
before a federal department or agency in which the United States is a party. 18
U.S.C. § 201 (1970) includes "an officer or employee or person acting for or on
behalf of the United States, or any department, agency or branch of Government
thereof . . in any official function. . . ."
37. See notes 47 and 59, infra, and accompanying text.
38. Letter to author from Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate
Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, United States Senate [on file at
CALIF. W. INT'L L.J.].
39. See note 7, supra, and accompanying text.
40. See note 6, supra, and accompanying text.
41. SECUrrES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, ch. 404, §§ 13(a), 14(a), 48 Stat.
894 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78n(a) (1970). These sections provide:
§ 78m. Periodical and other reports.
(a) Every issuer of a security registered pursuant to. . . this title
shall file with the Commission, in accordance with such rules and reg-
ulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate
for the proper protection of investors and to insure fair dealing in the
security-
(1) such information and documents. . . as the Commission
shall require to keep reasonably current the information and docu-
ments required to be included in or filed with an application or reg-
istration statement . ...
1976
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report such payments as material financial information.42 Thus,
the involvement of the SEC arises solely from the undisclosed
disbursement of corporate funds rather than actual bribery.
4 3
The SEC regulations require disclosure to shareholders, de-
scribing the purposes of such payments. 44  However, because they
fear unfavorable publicity, MNC's are reluctant to comply 4 5  Con-
sequently, they have persistently neglected to disclose the existence
or purposes of such payments to their auditors.46  By filing com-
plaints against MNC's suspected of having violated sections 13(a)
and 14(a), the SEC is attempting to enjoin further nondisclosure
violations, and, in effect, to deter the distribution of bribes or
similar payments abroad.
47
(2) such annual reports . . . certified if required by the rules
and regulations of the Commission by independent public account-
ants, and such quarterly reports . . . as the Commission may pre-
scribe.
Every issuer of a security registered on a national securities exchange
shall also file a duplicate original of such information . . . with the ex-
change.
§ 78n. Proxies.
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person by the use of the mails or
by any means or instrumentality. . . or of any facility of a national se-
curities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regu-
lations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary and appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to
permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authoriza-
tion in respect of any security . . . registered pursuant to . . . this title.
42. Id. The payments made are characterized as material expenditures
because of the substantially large size of the amounts expended without the
knowledge of the shareholders.
43. Letter to author from S. James Rosenfeld, Director, Office of Public
Information, Securities and Exchange Commission [hereinafter cited as Letter]
[on file at CALIF. W. INT'L L.J.].
44. Id.; 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12(b)-20, 240.13(1)-1, 240.14(a) -9 (1975).
45. TIME, Jan. 26, 1976, at 61.
46. TIME, June 23, 1975, at 52. In light of all that has transpired, it may be
that accounting firms should have a duty to inquire about such payments.
47. For example, the SEC has filed a complaint in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia against Gulf Oil Corporation. A portion of
the complaint is set forth below:
9. Since about 1960 and continuing to the date hereof defendants
GULF, WILD and others, singly and in concert, directly and indirectly,
and aiding and abetting each other, filed and caused to be filed with the
Commission certain reports including Annual Reports as required by
Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78m(a), and Rules 17
C.F.R. 240.12(b)-20 and 17 C.F.R. 240.13(a)-, which reports were
false and misleading and omitted to state material facts necessary to
make the statements made not misleading as more fully alleged in sub-
sequent paragraphs of this Count I.
Excerpt from complaint filed by SEC [on file at CALIF. W. INT'L L.J.]. Com-
plaints have also been filed in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia against Ashland Oil Corporation and the American Ship Building
Vol. 6
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An MNC alleged to have violated SEC regulations may es-
cape the imposition of sanctions. At any time after a complaint
has been filed, but prior to a hearing, the SEC, in its discretion,
may allow an MNC to consent to an order against it.4 The effect
of such an order is to allow an MNC, by promising to refrain from
further violations, to obtain a settlement without an admission of
guilt.4 9 On the other hand, if an MNC persists in further viola-
tions, the SEC or shareholders may prosecute the MNC in a new
action for failure to disclose. 50 Thus, the consent agreement is a
very desirable alternative for an MNC confronted for the first time
with this type of SEC action.
Proper disclosure by an MNC to shareholders and the SEC
concerning distribution of corporate funds to foreign officials
would preclude a violation of securities regulations. Under SEC
regulations it is irrelevant whether the funds expended are consid-
ered bribes in the United States; the concern of the SEC is only
with the non-disclosure of such payments. 51 'Proper disclosure
could be accomplished, therefore, by publishing in the financial
statement given to the shareholders and the SEC the amounts paid
as consultants' fees for each respective business transaction. Since
the SEC requires only that shareholders be informed of the
amounts and purposes for expenditures of corporate funds, this
method would be satisfactory.
52
Company [copies on file at CALIF. W. INT'L L.J.]. The SEC has the burden of
making the proper showing of a violation in these cases. The relevant portion of
the statute provides as follows: "upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary
injunction or restraining order shall be granted without bond." 15 U.S.C. §
78u(e) (1970).
48. 17 C.F.R. § 0.54(b) (1975). This section states:
(b) Consent order. At any time after the issuance of the com-
plaint and prior to the hearing in any proceeding, the Commission, in its
discretion, may allow the respondent to consent to an order. In so con-
senting, the respondent must submit, for filing in the record, a stipula-
tion or statement in which he admits at least those facts necessary to the
Commission's jurisdiction and agrees that an order may be entered
against him. Upon a record composed of the complaint and the stipula-
tion or agreement consenting to the order, the Commission may enter
the order consented to by the respondent, which shall have the same
force and effect as an order made after oral hearing.
49. id.
50. In the event of a successful prosecution an MNC would be subject to the
imposition of penalties. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1970). The penalties which may
be imposed include imprisonment or a fine of not more than $10,000. An
injunction may also be obtained against a firm violating securities regulations.
51. See Letter, note 43, supra.
52. The SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, §§ 13(a) and 14(a) and the
alleged violations in the complaints filed require only disclosure of "reasonably
current" information which is not "false" or "misleading."
1976
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While SEC regulations may be effective to require disclosure,
they are not effective in preventing the continued practice of mak-
ing such payments. Through proper disclosure, an MNC could pre-
clude SEC violations and unfavorable publicity, and could contin-
ue to make such expenditures. Only the IRS scrutinizes the nature
of such payments, to determine whether they qualify as legitimate
business deductions.
B. The IRS: Deductibility Of the Payment
MNC's subject to United States taxation51 which engage in
distribution of transaction fees or similar payments commonly
deduct these expenses from taxable income. Section 162(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 authorizes deduction of all
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxa-
ble year in conjunction with carrying on any trade or business.
54
Deductions are allowed, for example, for reasonable salaries or
other compensation paid for personal services.5 5  To qualify for
such deductions, MNC's must establish that payments to foreign
consultants or advisors are compensation and not gifts or other
non-deductible distributions.5 6 If the compensation is determined to
be reasonable, 57 it satisfies the requirement of being a legitimate
53. The United States exercises jurisdiction to tax an MNC if it is: (1)
operating in the United States; (2) organized under United States law; or (3) a
foreign corporation controlled by United States shareholders. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 864(b), (c); Reg. §§ 1.864-2- 1864-7; see also Norr, lurisdiction to Tax
and International Income, 17 TAX L. REv. 431 (1962). "Controlled Foreign
Corporation" refers to a foreign corporation in which more than 50% of the
voting stock is owned by, or is treated as being owned by United States sharehold-
ers. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 957(a). A United States shareholder is any
United States person who owns or is treated as owning 10% or more of the voting
power of a foreign corporation. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 951(b). A United
States person is any United States citizen or resident, domestic partnership or
corporation or any trust or estate (except a foreign trust or estate). INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, §§ 957(d), 7701(a)(30).
54. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a)(1).
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Palmetto Pump & Irrigation Co. v. Tomlinson, 9 Am. Fed. Tax
R.2d 1136 (S.D. Fla., 1962), aff'd, 313 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1963). In this case the
court determined that if amounts paid to stockholders were paid to them because
of their ownership in the business, then the amounts were not compensation. On
the other hand, if the amounts paid were for personal services rendered to the
corporation as employees, then these amounts are to be considered compensation.
57. See, e.g., Robert Rogers Inc. v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 1014 (Ct. Cl.
1950) in which the court held that compensation awarded under a contract which
provided for a small salary with the balance to be paid as a bonus equal to 50% of
the net profits of the business and pursuant to a reasonable bargain made before
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business expense, and an MNC may then deduct it from taxable
income."8 The IRS has invoked section 162(c)(1) to disallow
those deductions which it characterizes as illegal bribes as defined
by the policy advocated in the United States. 59
Under section 162(c)(1) of the Code, no deduction is al-
lowed for payments to foreign officials or their employees if such
payments would be unlawful in the United States.60  Present do-
mestic statutes characterize payments to American officials or their
employees for official action as illegal bribes.61 Consequently, the
IRS interprets similar payments to foreign officials as being illegal
bribes as well.62 "Officials", in this context, refers to any individu-
al officially connected with a government, agency or instrumentali-
ty of a foreign nation.63 Such individuals may be serving in any
capacity on a permanent or temporary basis.64 Whether the indi-
the services were rendered was a fully deductible expense even if the amounts
when paid far exceeded the usual norms.
58. Id.
59. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(c)(1). This section states in pertinent
part:
Illegal payments to government officials or employees
No deduction shall be allowed . . . for any payment made, directly
or indirectly, to an official or employee of any government, . . . if the
payment constitutes an illegal bribe or kickback or, if the payment is to
an official or employee of a foreign government, the payment would be
unlawful under the laws of the United States if such laws were applica-
ble to such payment and to such official or employee.
For a discussion of regulation with respect to domestic bribery, see Note, Federal
Income Taxation-Public Policy and the Deductibility of Kickbacks Under §
162(c)(2), 32 Omto ST. L.J. 686 (1974).
60. See id.
61. See, e.g., Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 (1954), in which the
defendant was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2 and § 281 (superceded in 1962
by § 209) on charges that he conspired with and induced a federal employee to
accept outside compensation for services in a matter before a Federal agency in
which the United States had an interest.
62. See note 59, supra and accompanying text.
63. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, Reg. § 1.162-18(a)(3). This section provides
in pertinent part:
Official or employee of a government. Any individual officially con-
nected with...
(ii) The government of a foreign country, or
(iii) A political subdivision of, or a corporation or other entity
serving as an agency or instrumentality of, any of the above, ...
in whatever capacity, whether on a permanent or temporary basis, and
whether or not serving for compensation, shall be included within the
term "official or employee of a government", regardless of the place of
residence or post of duty of such individual. An independent contractor




California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 6, No. 2 [1976], Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol6/iss2/6
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
vidual receives compensation from his government is not decisive
in determining if the individual is a government official. 5
Within the meaning of section 162(c)(1), the IRS considers
a payment to an agent or middleman employed by a foreign official
as merely an indirect means to the same illegal bribe. 6 For
example, a payment to an agent or relative of a foreign official may
be treated as payment to that official if it inures or will inure to his
benefit, or will promote his financial or other interests. Similarly,
a payment by an MNC to an agent acting on its behalf in the
transaction of business and who is also representing a foreign
official in the official's country may be characterized as an indirect
bribe to the official or employee of that nation.68 For this reason,
such payments are not legally deductible expenses, and a business
which attempts to deduct them from taxable income is in violation
of tax regulations. However, an individual employed exclusively
by an MNC is not ordinarily considered by the IRS to be an
"official" or agent of a foreign government.69 Any compensation
paid to him may be a deductible expense. In this instance the
legitimacy of the deduction hinges on a semantic distinction.
The characterization of an MNC employee as an independent
consultant, as an agent of a foreign official, or as a middleman in a
dual capacity representing both the corporation and a foreign
official, determines whether the individual's compensation is con-
sidered to be a deductible business expense.7" If an individual is
retained as an agent or middleman for the purpose of compensat-
ing a foreign official, then the IRS will characterize the individual
as an agent of the foreign official, and the entire amount paid by
the MNC will be an illegal bribe, and therefore, non-deductible.
71
65. Id.
66. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(c)(1), note 59, supra.
67. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, Reg. § 1.162-18(a)(2). This section provides
in pertinent part:
Indirect payment. For purposes of this paragraph, an indirect payment
to an individual shall include any payment which inures to his benefit or
promotes his interests, regardless of the medium in which the payment is
made and regardless of the identity of the immediate recipient or pay-
or. . . . A payment made by an agent or independent contractor of the
taxpayer which benefits the taxpayer shall be treated as an indirect pay-
ment by the taxpayer to the official or employee.
For an analogous case, see Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 (1954).
68. See id.
69. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, Reg. § 1.162-18(a)(3), note 63, supra.
70. Id.
71. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 16 2(c) (1), note 59, supra.
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Conversely, if an independent individual is retained as a consultant
to advise and counsel an MNC on foreign business matters and not
merely to compensate a foreign official, then any reasonable funds
disbursed to the consultant will be an allowable deduction.72
Seemingly, this distinction is based on whether the individual
retained is a known agent of a foreign official. To date, disclosure
before the Senate Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations by
representatives of some MNC's concerning the identity of agents
employed to compensate foreign officials has provided the only
means by which the IRS can determine that an illegal bribe has
been paid.73 Absent such disclosures, there appears to be no other
way that the legality of a deduction for consultants' fees may be
determined. The realization that such deductions have only re-
cently come under IRS scrutiny, and then only because of the
subcommittee disclosures, is evidence of the difficulty involved in
making this determination.
The investigation of MNC's by the IRS raises important ques-
tions which require more explicit regulations clearly delineating
IRS standards. If an MNC retains a foreign independent consul-
tant or advisor without intending that he compensate foreign offi-
cials from his fee, is it required to trace the path of disbursed
funds? If it employs an independent foreign consultant and com-
pensates this individual, should it be forced to inquire as to the
source of the consultant's information? The criteria for making
these determinations have not been made clear by the IRS. Fur-
thermore, must an MNC require as a condition of retaining a
foreign independent consultant that all funds paid to the consultant
not be distributed to any foreign officials? How could such a
condition be enforced? A requirement that an MNC discover and
disclose the identity of the ultimate recipient of its payments would
place an unreasonable burden on the ability of an MNC to compete
effectively in international commerce. MNC's which adhere to
current IRS policy might not be able to compete effectively under
acceptable international standards because foreign independent
consultants or agents might be disinclined to transact business
within the confines of United States law. 74 International custom
72. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, Reg. 1.162-18(a) (3), note 63, supra.
73. See 121 CONG. REC. 11,342 (daily ed. June 23, 1975) (remarks of
Senator Haskell). The IRS is not authorized to conduct investigations outside the
United States.
74. See note 32, supra.
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and local policy of the host country, as in the case of Syrian law75
which requires the use of agents, may dictate a policy contrary to
that of the IRS. As a result, an MNC adhering to IRS policy
would be at a competitive disadvantage in transacting business.
Some MNC's, however, may determine that the long term benefits
to be gained outweigh the expenses, and in this case might simply
decide not to deduct the payments from taxable income at all.
Clearer and more definitive standards pertaining to the de-
ductibility of foreign independent consultants' fees are necessary.
The present IRS policy disallowing deductions for payments to
foreign officials poses some major difficulties for effective regula-
tions of illegal bribes. Clear guidelines must be established to
define whether a fee paid to a foreign consultant represents legal
compensation or an illegal bribe. These guidelines must not un-
reasonably restrict the ability of MNC's to compete in international
commerce. Answers to these questions are necessary to clarify the
nature and extent of an MNC's duty to discover tho ultimate
recipient of funds paid and the source of the consultants' advice,
and to formulate conditions to be placed on fees paid to foreign
consultants.
Even though current policy is at variance with international
custom, Congress is considering even more restrictive measures in
an effort to curtail the practice of international corporate bribery.76
One such measure would impose criminal sanctions for bribery of a
foreign official. 77  This would necessitate the exercise of extraterri-
torial jurisdiction, an extention of sovereignty frowned upon under
international law.78  International law supports the view that each
75. Id.
76. Two bills have been introduced in the House of Representatives. One
would give authority to the State Department to monitor the activities of American
based MNC's abroad, and the other would amend Title 18 of the United States
Code specifically to prohibit bribery of any foreign official. 121 CoNG. REc. 2946
(daily ed. June 6, 1975) (H.R. 7563 and 7539, respectively, were introduced by
Congressman Solarz). Another proposed bill would terminate the investment
insurance issued by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation in any case
where an insured investor is found to have bribed a foreign official. 121 CONG.
REC. 5044 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1975) (H.R. 9860 was introduced by Congressman
Solarz).
77. See H.R. 7539, note 76, supra.
78. There are five basic theories of jurisdiction which are recognized to
varying degrees in international law and which might be the basis for the exercise
of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the United States. They are: (1) the territorial
principle, which is the most generally accepted, and bases jurisdiction on the place
where the act occurred; (2) the nationality principle of criminal jurisdiction under
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nation has the right to maintain exclusive jurisdiction to regulate
the activities and investments of MNC's within its territorial bound-
aries. r9 The substance of this position is evident in the efforts of
the United Nations.
III. REGULATION OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. The United Nations: Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States
The United Nations has adopted the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States 0 which outlines the rights and duties
of nations in regulating activities of MNC's within each state's
territorial boundaries. The Charter defines the scope of authority
and sets out the regulatory procedures to be implemented by each
nation. It states that each nation has the exclusive authority to
determine what conduct it considers proper within its sovereign
territory. s' This authority includes the power to decide economic
and social policies and customs."' The Charter offers no definitive
guidelines or standards to aid in the determination of what acts
constitute bribery. Furthermore, no provision even refers to the
use of bribery or transaction fees.3 The only standard available is
which a sovereign may claim jurisdiction over a citizen of that nation although
acts are committed in another State; (3) the protective principle of jurisdiction
which may be claimed when some national interest is harmed by an act; (4) the
passive personality principle which bases jurisdiction upon the nationality of the
injured person; and (5) the universal principle which follows the individual who
commits a crime of an international nature wherever he is found so that jurisdic-
tion is determined by the country which has custody regardless of where the act
occurred. See Bassiouni, Theories of Jurisdiction and Their Application in
Extradition Law and Practice, 5 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 1 (1974).
79. See note 80 and text accompanying note 89, infra.
80. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 24
U.N. GAOR Supp. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) (reproduced in 14 Irr'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 251 (1975)) [hereinafter cited as Charter]. This resolution was
unanimously passed on December 12, 1974. The significant portion of the reso-
lution appears below:
2. Each State has the right:
(a) To regulate and exercise authority over foreign investment
within its national jurisdiction in accordance with its laws and regula-




83. The only document of a multinational nature which makes reference to
the use of bribery is the Organization of American States: Permanent Council
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that of international custom which recognizes the use of transaction
fees in business dealings. Consequently, a conflict in interpreta-
tion exists between international business custom and the policy of
the United States.
Article 2, paragraph 2(a) of the Charter provides exclusive
jurisdiction to nations to ensure that MNC's within their territory
comply with their sovereign law. As in the case of Syrian law,84
which requires that an agent be retained before business may be
transacted, the use of agents is not precluded. Although the provi-
sions establishing the jurisdictional rights of each nation as outlined
in article 2, paragraph 2(a), do not specifically state that such
jurisdiction is exclusive, this inference, nevertheless, finds support
under international law. Both the United Nations recommenda-
tion5 and the territorial principle of jurisdiction"" in international
law dictate that the right of each nation to control the activities
within its borders is a mutually exclusive element of sovereignty.
From the enactment of this article, it is apparent that the desire of
the international sector is to allow each nation exclusively to deter-
mine which business practices are deemed proper within its bor-
ders.
The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States reaf-
firms the international policy that each nation has the exclusive
right to monitor the actitivies of MINC's within its own borders. It
is also in accord with international custom which recognizes the use
of agents or consultants in business transactions. Further distinc-
tions between United States and international policy are evident in
the United Nations recommendation pertaining to the activities of
MNC's abroad.
Resolution of the Behavior of Transnational Enterprises, O.A.S. Doe. OEA/Ser. G,
CP/RES. 154 (167/75) of July 10, 1975 [reproduced in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATRr-
ALS 1326 (1975)]. This resolution was approved unanimously by the Permanent
Council of the O.A.S. The relevant sections appear below:
I. To condemn in the most emphatic terms any act of bribery, illegal
payment or offer of payment by any transnational enterprise; any de-
mand for or acceptance of improper payments by any public or private
person, as well as any act contrary to ethics and legal procedures; and
II. To urge the governments of the member states, insofar as neces-
sary, to clarify their national laws with regard to the aforementioned im-
proper or illegal acts.
Id. at 1328.
84. See note 32, supra.
85. See note 87, infra.
86. See note 93, infra, and accompanying text.
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B. The United Nations: A Recommendation
In 1974, the United Nations appointed a group of eminent
persons to study the effects of MNC's on the international commu-
nity. From this study, 7 a recommendation was presented to the
United Nations which adopted it as a guideline for international
regulation of MNC's. as The study determined that intergovern-
mental confrontations and serious economic consequences would
result unless the entire international community complies with a
uniform policy.8" The United Nations recommended that the
domestic policy, law and jurisdiction of the country in which the
parent company resides apply only until an MNC enters the juris-
diction of a foreign state.90 Once established in a foreign nation,
the MNC subsidary would be subject to the policy, law and juris-
diction of the host government only. 1 The United Nations further
recommended that all States refrain from extraterritorial applica-
tion of domestic policy unless contrary agreement could be
reached."
The effect of this recommendation on the use of foreign
consultants or agents is consistent with international custom and
the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. In accord
with international policy, the United Nations recommendation does
not preclude the use of foreign consultants or agents in nations
which require their employment to transact business.
This United Nations recommendation reflects the consensus
of global opinion and is in accord with the territorial principle, the
most widely recognized basis of jurisdiction in international law.93
This principle states that each sovereign nation has the exclusive
right to determine what is proper conduct within its borders.94 The
87. The Impact of Multinational Corporations on the Development Process
and on International Relations, U.N. Doe. E/5500/Add. 1 (Part I) (1974)
(reproduced in 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 800, 826 (1974)) [hereinafter cited as
U.N. Study of MNC's].
88. Id.
89. Id. at 828. See also Reich, Global Social Responsibility for the Multina-
tionals, 8 TEx. INT'L L.J. 187 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Reich].
90. U.N. Study of MNC's, supra note 87, at 828.
91. id. at 829.
92. Id.
93. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 327-28 (8th ed. 1955); see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 17
(1965). Under this theory, a state's right to prescribe and enforce conduct within
its own physical boundaries is an inseverable component of sovereignty.
94. See authority cited in note 93, supra.
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United States, however, does not adhere to this concept and is
unilaterally attempting to enforce abroad its domestic policy con-
cerning MNC's. In doing so, the United States must exercise
extraterritorial jurisdiction, which conflicts with the territorial prin-
ciple of jurisdiction.
IV. UNILATERAL APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES POLICY:
ITS EFFECTS ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
American policy is not in accord with that of the United
Nations. The United States views MNC's as instruments of Amer-
ican foreign policy in nations where MNC subsidiaries operate, 95
and as potential conduits for extraterritorial application of United
States law.9" American economic dominance and the fact that the
majority of MNC's are American controlled contributes significant-
ly to the "alter ego" impact on such foreign nations.9 7  As a result,
the United States is experiencing increased resentment from coun-
tries subjected to this new form of "imperialism." 8
In order to succeed, MNC's must adapt to the country in
which business is transacted, and for this reason, a commitment
must be made to local policies.99 Businesses are not committed to
national, social or political goals and objectives, except insofar as
those factors affect business. 100 An American-based MNC operat-
ing under the laws of a foreign country is influenced to a greater
95. See Rubin, Multinational Enterprise and National Sovereignty: A Skep-
tic's Analysis, 3 LAw & POL. INT'L Bus. 1, 10 (1971).
96. Id.
97. See note 5, supra, and accompanying text.
98. Litvak & Maule, The Multi-national Firm and Conflicting National
Interests, 3 J.W.T.L. 309 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Conflicting Interests]; Note,
Canada's Changing Posture Toward Multinational Corporations: An Attempt to
Harmonize Nationalism With Continued Industrial Growth, 7 N.Y.U.J. INT'L LAW
& POL. 271, 277 (1974). United States Foreign Assets Control law applied to
subsidiaries of American MNC's in Canadian territory is considered by Canada to
be a perfect example of United States extraterritorial violation under international
law. The problem involves two aspects: (1) the legal implications which arise
from the imposition of United States law on firms incorporated in Canada, and;
(2) a conflict of national policies. For example, the policy of the United States
has been not to trade with communist countries, while Canada has encouraged
such trade. Litvak & Maule, supra note 2, at 637. For an example of such a
United States Foreign Asset Control law, see Trading With the Enemy Act of
1917, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-44 (1970).
99. Miller, The Global Corporation and American Constitutionalism: Some
Political Consequences of Economic Power, 6 J. Int'L L. & ECON. 235, 245 (1972)
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degree by that country's policies than by United States policies. 10 1
Similarly, an MNC would be committed to American policy only to
the extent such policy affected its business interests in the United
States. As a result, significance is no longer attached to the
distinction between domestic and international markets. 10 2 MNC's
which operate at this stage of development have attained multina-
tional orientation, and, therefore, business transactions performed
must be in harmony with international policy. 10 Unilateral appli-
cation of American policy exposes MNC's to conflicting policies
which could have detrimental effects for the United States and
MNC's based there.
An MNC experiencing the pressure of such a conflict could
relocate its international parent headquarters or the registered legal
domicile of its controlling shareholders to escape United States
jurisdiction." 4 By relocating outside the United States, an MNC
would no longer be subject to domestic policy, except to the extent
that it or its subsidiary transacted business in the United States.
The prospects of relocation are not remote. For example, when
the United States attempted to restrict the capital outflow of Inter-
national Nickel, the company moved its parent headquarters to
Canada, 0 5 which does not impose such restrictions. The move was
made in order to prevent valuable business from being lost as a
result of United States policy.
Other MNC's may also find relocation simple and desireable
if corporate assets become greater abroad than in the United
States.' Furthermore, with the advent of European management
centers, 07 such a shift becomes a relatively simple matter. 08 If
MNC's relocate, the United States may suffer a loss of economic
influence, substantial tax revenues and spendable income. 1° 9 Ad-
101. Conflicting Interests, supra note 98, at 315.
102. Miller, supra note 99, at 245.
103. Id.
104. See Reich, supra note 89, at 207 in which he states that, "if the parent
government were to place uncomfortable limits upon multinational activity, the
multinational corporation would quickly move to find a new parent government
and a new home."
105. Behrman, supra note 2, at 228.
106. Id.
107. European management centers are the local headquarters of MNC's
which handle operations in the entire European area rather than from the location
of the international parent headquarters.
108. Behrman, supra note 2, at 228.
109. Although the entire amount would not be lost; for purposes of an
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ditionally, it may mean a loss of numerous jobs.110 Avoidance of
such relocation dictates that the United States subscribe to interna-
tional business policy and not attempt to apply domestic policy
extraterritorially.
Another probable repercussion of unilateral application of
United States policy might be to render United States controlled
MNC's uncompetitive in the international market."' If an MNC
adheres to United States policy abroad, it would be precluded from
transacting business in nations which require the use of agents. 11"
MNC's would also be uncompetitive in countries which recognize
the use of transaction fees. Ultimately, this inability to compete
would affect not only MNC's, but would cause numerous economic
repercussions in the United States as well.
V. CONCLUSION
The use of "bribery" or transaction fees, under certain cir-
cumstances, is recognized as a customary method of transacting
business in international commerce. United States legislators and
agencies have determined that the use of such payments is an
illegal and undesirable practice. The resources of the SEC and the
IRS are simultaneously being utilized to deter the use of such
payments, and Congress is considering even more stringent action.
While the SEC requirement of disclosure to shareholders would
seem perfectly proper, the IRS should allow transaction fees as a
deductible expense, without resort to questionable semantic distinc-
tions, especially where such payments are essential to transacting
business in foreign nations.
The United States must recognize that the use of transaction
fees is a fact of life beyond its control and is endemic to the systems
example of the size of the amount involved, the fiscal 1977 United States
corporation income taxes are estimated at approximately $49 million. MA-
NAGEMENT BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL
YEAR 1976 312 (1975).
110. In 1973, in a report to the Senate Finance Committee, the Tariff
Commission (now the International Trade Commission) reviewed competing
claims concerning the effect of foreign investment on domestic jobs and found that
the question cannot be answered conclusively. Under assumptions that the study
determined to be the most realistic of those considered, it found an overall gain of
half a million U.S. jobs. Patrick, U.S. Tax Policy and Foreign Investments-
Legislative and Treaty Issues, 5 DEN. J. INT'L LAW & POL. 1, 4 (1975).
111. See note 1, supra, and accompanying text.
1.12. See note 32, supra, and accompanying text.
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of many nations. It is highly questionable whether the United
States has the power to terminate unilaterally this practice. More-
over, an unsuccessful attempt to do so might jeopardize diplomatic
relations with many foreign nations and precipitate irreversible
damage to United States business interests abroad. At -the very least,
a careful re-examination of United States policy by the executive
and legislative branches is mandatory. The economic, social and
legal ramifications of any proposed regulatory action must be
carefully balanced with the ethical considerations.
In concluding this comment, a statement by A. Gerstacker,
Chairman of the Dow Chemical Company poses a final provocative
thought:
The anational company may be the major hope in the world
today for economic cooperation among people, for prosperity
among nations, for peace in our world. I have long dreamed
of buying an island owned 'by no nation, and of establishing
the world headquarters of the Dow company on the truly
neutral ground of such an island, beholden to no nation or
society." 3
Michael S. Sinkeldam
113. Reich, supra note 89, at 187.
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